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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE REASONABLENESS
REQUIREMENT AND FOURTH AMENDMENT BOUNDARIES TO
CO-OCCUPANT CONSENT
Georgiav. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006)*
Tim Buskirk*
Respondent, Scott Randolph, and his wife, Janet Randolph, were both
present when police officers requested consent to perform a warrantless
search of Respondent's residence.' Respondent was absolute in his refusal
to consent; 2 however, Respondent's wife consented to the search. 3 Upon
searching the residence, the officers discovered evidence of drug use,4 and
Respondent was indicted for cocaine possession.' The trial court found the
search reasonable because Respondent's wife was a co-occupant of the
premises and consented to the search.6 The Court of Appeals of Georgia
reversed the trial court's decision and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed.7 The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that the search was
invalid because a present and objecting co-occupant does not forfeit the

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. HurstAward for Outstanding
Case Comment in Spring 2007,
** I would like to thank my family for their unwavering encouragement and support.
1. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). The officers initially arrived at
Respondent's residence in response to a domestic dispute call made by Respondent's wife. Id.
Respondent's wife mentioned to the officers that Respondent had taken their son from the residence
and that Respondent was a habitual cocaine user. Id. This statement prompted the officers'
suspicion that drugs may be in the residence. See id. Respondent arrived at his residence shortly
after the officers arrived. Id.
2. Id. When one of the officers asked Respondent for his consent to allow the officers to
search his residence, Respondent clearly and "unequivocally refused" to give his consent. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.The officers initially discovered a "powdery residue" in one of the bedrooms. Id. They
later returned with a search warrant and discovered and seized other "evidence of drug use." Id.
5. Id.
6. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107-08. Respondent "moved to suppress the evidence, as products
of a warrantless search of his house unauthorized by his wife's consent over his express refusal. The
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Janet Randolph had common authority to consent to the
search." Id.
7. Id. at 108.
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right to control who has access to the residence simply because another cooccupant consents to entry.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,
affirmed, and HELD, that a warrantless search for evidence is unreasonable
when a present co-occupant expressly refuses to consent to the search
despite the consent of another present co-occupant. 9
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and specifically mentions houses as one area where this protection
absolutely exists.'" Although the search in the instant case took place in a
house," the Supreme Court initially addressed the reasonableness of thirdparty consent to warrantless searches in a different factual setting.' 2
In Frazier v. Cupp, the Court addressed the reasonableness of a
warrantless search, with regard to an absent individual, when a consenting
third-party is the only party present at the time law enforcement officers
request to search an item and the third-party and the absent individual
share access or use of that item.'3 In Frazier,Petitioner and his cousin,
Rawls, shared a duffel bag that was kept in Rawls's residence." Upon
Rawls's arrest, police obtained Rawls's consent to search the duffel bag for
his clothing, but Petitioner did not consent because he was not in the house
at the time.' 5 During the search, police found and took Petitioner's
clothing, which was later admitted into evidence for the prosecution of
Petitioner for murder.'6 The Court affirmed the murder conviction holding
that the search of the duffel bag was not unreasonable as to Petitioner, and
therefore, did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.' 7

8. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court "held that an individual who chooses to live with another
assumes a risk no greater than 'an inability to control access to the premises during [his] absence."'
Id. (quoting State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004)).
9. Id. at 108, 120.
10. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in pertinent part: "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (explaining that "[a]s the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed."'(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
11. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.
12. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
13. Id. at 740.
14. Id.
15. Id. Both Rawls and his mother consented to the search of the duffel bag. Id.
16. Id. at 732, 740. Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder by an Oregon state
court. Id. at 732. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. Petitioner's writ ofhabeas
corpus was granted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon; however, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. Frazier,394 U.S. at 732.
17. Frazier,394 U.S. at 740.
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The Court first recognized that a mutual agreement to share the duffel
bag meant that either user was authorized to give police officers consent
to its search. 8 After establishing this premise, the Court reasoned that
Petitioner had assumed the risk that his cousin might grant another
individual access to the bag. 9 Therefore, the fact that Petitioner did not
consent to law enforcement officers searching the duffel bag was
irrelevant 0 so long as another mutual user of the same bag did grant
consent.2'
Building upon its establishment of third-party consent in Frazier,the
Court in United States v. Matlock addressed whether a live-in girlfriend
could consent to the search of a shared residence when her boyfriend,
Respondent, was not present to consent.22 In Matlock, Respondent was
arrested for bank robbery23 in the front yard of the house in which
Respondent resided with his girlfriend, Gayle Graff, and her family.24 The
officers did not ask Respondent for consent to search the residence, but
instead obtained consent from Graf.25 The officers found stolen cash in
Respondent's bedroom, which was later used as evidence to indict him for
bank robbery.26 Respondent moved to suppress the evidence found in his
bedroom 27 on the grounds that the search was unreasonable. 28 The district
court upheld Respondent's motion, taking the position that the
Government failed to establish that Graff had "actual authority to consent

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.The Court noted: "Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in leaving it
in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look
inside." Id.
21. Id.
22. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.Respondent had already been arrested at the time officers asked to search the
residence. Id.Respondent was, therefore, not present at the time Graff consented to the search of
the residence. See id.
Even though the officers knew Respondent was a resident of the house at the
time of his arrest, they did not ask for his consent to search the residence. Id.Graft's consent to
search the house included consent to search the bedroom shared by Graff and Respondent. Matlock,
415 U.S. at 166.
26. Id.at 166-67.
27. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
28. See id. at 166-67.
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to the search." 29 The court of appeals affirmed, but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.3°
The U.S. Supreme Court could not find any reason why Graff's
representations to law enforcement officers regarding her connection to the
residence should not be considered reliable.3' In directly addressing the
general rule of third-party consent, the Court expanded the Frazierrule to
33 the Court ruled that the common
residences.32 Relying heavily on Frazier,
authority element in a shared residence is the most significant reason for
allowing any resident to consent to the entry of an outsider.34 Therefore,
any resident of a shared premises may consent to its search regardless of
the fact that the other absent residents cannot or do not consent.35
Further expanding on the extent to which third-party consent justifies
a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Illinois v.
Rodrigue 36 ruled that a law enforcement officer's reasonable belief that,
based on an objective standard, a person consenting to a warrantless search
has actual authority to do so is all that is necessary to validate the search.37
In Rodriguez, Respondent's girlfriend, Gail Fischer, called law
enforcement officers after Respondent beat her.38 Fischer was staying at her

29. Id. at 168. The district court excluded a significant portion of Graff's oral statements to
the officers, classifying them as hearsay. See id. The district court reasoned that the remaining,
admissible statements made by Graft, in addition to other evidence creating an "'inference"' that
the Respondent and Graft occasionally slept together in the east bedroom, were not sufficient to
reasonably establish that Graff shared Respondent's bedroom. Id. at 168-69.
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id. at 172-77.
32. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170. The Court stated: "[T]he consent of one who possesses
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared." Id.
33. See id.at 171-72.
34. Id. The Court clarified the baseline rule relating to third-party consent of a warrantless
search as follows:
These cases at least make clear that when the prosecution seeks to justify a
warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was
obtained from a third-party who possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
Id. at 171.
35. See supratext accompanying note 32.
36. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
37. Id. at 188-89.
38. Id. at 179.
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mother's house.39 Fischer accompanied the officers to Respondent's
apartment, unlocked the door, and consented to their entry.4" The officers
arrested Respondent after they discovered illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia in the apartment.4 Respondent moved to suppress the
evidence discovered during the search.42 The state trial court upheld
Respondent's motion and the ruling was affirmed on appeal.43 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari" and reversed the decision of the Illinois
Appellate Court.45
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on what is an objectively
reasonable search given the circumstances.' The Court cautioned that
subsequent courts must examine the facts of each case to ascertain the
validity of an individual's claim that he or she actually has authority to
consent to a search.47 In Rodriguez, the Court ruled that if it is objectively
reasonable for a law enforcement officer to believe that a third-party
consenting to a warrantless search has the authority to do so, then the
search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
The Court in the instant case acknowledged the Rodriguez rationale by
recognizing the existence of a broad test for determining whether an
individual appears to have common authority over a shared premises.49

39. Id.
40. Id. at 179-80. The information gathered by the officers from Fischer led them to believe
that Fischer had the authority to consent to an entry of Respondent's apartment. See id. at 179.
"During this conversation, Fischer several times referred to the apartment on South California
[street] as 'our' apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there." Id.
41. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
42. Id. Respondent claimed that Fischer "had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier"
and thus lacked any authority that would allow her to consent to a search of his apartment. Id.
43. Id. The trial court agreed that Fischer's consent did not validate the search. Id. The
Illinois Appellate Court "affirmed the Circuit Court in all respects. The Illinois Supreme Court
denied the State's petition for leave to appeal ..... Id.
44. Id. at 181.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
47. Id. The Court stated:
[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may always
accept a person's invitation to enter premises. Even when the invitation is
accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding
circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its
truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.
Id.
48. Id. at 188-89 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
49. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181-82).
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The Court, however, was unable to apply the broad objective
reasonableness test established in Rodriguez to the facts in the instant
case." The presence of two co-occupants who express opposing opinions
concerning consent to search the residence changes the dynamic of the
analysis from an objective reasonableness test to a social expectations
test.5 ' Therefore, the Rodriguez objective reasonableness test alone was
insufficient to solve the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of consent
issue in the instant case.52
In an effort to thoroughly review relevant precedent, the Court in the
instant case cited Rodriguez and recognized consent as an exception to the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against a warrantless search of an
individual's residence.53 The instant Court then referred to Matlock as a
solidification of a co-occupant's authority to consent to a warrantless
search.54 Citing Matlock, the instant Court clarified that the principle of cooccupant authority to consent to a warrantless search arises from
commonly understood social expectations and not from property law.5
After making this distinction, the Randolph Court agreed that social

50. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113. The instant Court identifies the unique fact pattern in this
case where two present co-occupants disagree over whether to allow law enforcement officers to
search the residence. Id. The instant Court acknowledges that it has "not dealt directly with the
reasonableness of police entry" in this situation and then begins a social expectations analysis of
this situation. Id.
51. See infra text accompanying note 55.
52. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114-15. The instant Court emphasizes the expanded
applicability of the social expectations test. See id. The measure of reasonableness of the search
no longer involves only a determination of whether it is objectively reasonable that each person at
the door is an occupant of the shared residence. See id. Social expectations dictate that the refusal
of one present co-occupant to allow consent to search the residence nullifies any grant of consent
to search the residence by any other co-occupant. See id.
53. Id. at 109 (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181).
54. Id. at 111.
55. Id. at 110. The instant Court included the following language from Matlock to explain
why a third-party has the authority to consent to a warrantless search of a residence to retrieve
evidence:
The authority which justified the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of
property, with its attendant historical and legal refinement, but rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have
assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched.
Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
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expectations of the likelihood of a guest to accept an invitation to enter a
residence will vary greatly depending upon the circumstances under which
the invitation to enter is given. 6
The Court had never addressed the validity of consent to perform a
warrantless search in a situation where there are two present co-occupants
and one grants consent while the other opposes it.57 Therefore, the instant
Court turned its attention to the socially expected outcome of a guest being
invited into the residence by one co-occupant and denied entry by
another.5 After reasoning that one co-occupant does not generally have
any dominion over another,59 the instant Court concluded that one cooccupant's consent to a guest's entry while the other refuses is the
equivalent of no invitation to entry. 60 Therefore, applying social
expectations to the instant case, police entry in this situation is considered
unreasonable. 6 ' The instant Court held that the refusal by one present cooccupant to consent to a search of the co-occupant's residence negates the
ability of law enforcement officers to obtain consent to search the
residence from any other co-occupant.62

56. Id.at 113. The instant Court implied that a guest would almost certainly enter if the only
present co-occupant offered the guest an invitation to enter the residence. See id To emphasize the
difference in the expected behavior of the guest if two present co-occupants do not agree on
allowing the guest to enter the residence, the instant Court stated the following:
[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have
no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to
enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, "stay out." Without some very good
reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.
Id.
57. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108.
58. Seeid. at lll.
59. Id.at 114. The instant Court stated: "[T]here is no common understanding that one cotenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another... ." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.The following language from the instant Court clarifies this conclusion:
Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third-party has no recognized
authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant,
his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to
reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any
consent at all.
Id.
62. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120. The holding of the instant Court states: "We therefore hold
that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by
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Mindful of the potentially harmful implications of its decision in
domestic abuse situations, the instant Court stressed that those inflicting
domestic abuse would not be afforded protection under the instant
holding.63 Law enforcement entry into a residence in domestic abuse
situations is categorically different from entry due to a resident's consent
to search a house for evidence of criminal activity.' The instant Court
firmly asserted that its decision only applied to law enforcement officers
requesting consent to perform an evidential search.65
That established, the Court pointed out that the instant case is dealing
with a completely different exception to the Fourth Amendment.66 The
instant case is only focused on whether consent to perform a search is
67 Matlock,68 and Rodriguez69
reasonable, as were the prior cases of Frazier,
to which the instant Court looked for guidance.
Finally, the instant Court clarified two potential ambiguities that could
arise after its opinion.7" The first was the need for a further distinction of
the Matlock opinion. 7' The authority in Matlock for valid co-occupant
consent to entry was derived from social expectations, not property law,
and only applies when one present co-occupant consents to entry.72 The
second was a reemphasis of the very narrow application of the instant
holding. 73 The holding in the instant case is only pertinent if two, or more,
present co-occupants take opposing positions when law enforcement

a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent
given to the police by another resident." Id.
63. Id. at 118.
64. Id. The instant Court stated: "[T]his case has no bearing on the capacity of the police to
protect domestic victims." Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.at 118-19. The instant Court stated: "The undoubted right of police to enter in order
to protect a victim, however, has nothing to do with the question in this case, whether a search with
the consent of one co-tenant is good against another, standing at the door and expressly refusing
consent." Id.
67. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969). "Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he
clearly had authority to consent to its search." Id. at 740.
68. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). The Court focused on the legal
sufficiency of third-party consent to search a residence. Id.at 166. The Court's analysis using legal
sufficiency is very similar to an analysis of reasonableness. See id.at 176.
69. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). The Court specifically focused on a law
enforcement officer's reasonable belief with regard to whether a third-party consenting to a search
of a shared residence had authority to do so. Id.at 179.
70. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-21.
71. Id.at 120.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 55.
73. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
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483

officers request consent to perform an evidential search of the residence.7 4
The Frazier Court discussed the foundation for valid third-party
consent to a warrantless search of a shared space.75 Matlock expanded the
applicability of such consents to shared residences.76 Rodriguez then
addressed the apparent authority of such third-party consent." The
Rodriguez Court described the objective standard that law enforcement
officers at the scene must utilize before a third-party's consent to a
warrantless search is deemed valid.78
The instant Court abruptly halted the steadily advancing line of cases
granting reasonableness to warrantless searches of residences when consent
is granted by a third-party.79 Recognizing the complications in applying
past decisions to the instant facts,"0 the Court refused to declare one cooccupant's consent to a warrantless search of a residence reasonable when
another objecting co-occupant is present at the time consent to the search
is requested."'
Once again focusing on the reasoning employed in the Matlock
decision, the instant Court reaffirmed the rule that a single co-occupant
may consent to the warrantless search of a shared residence.8 2 The instant
Court then analyzed the dramatically different circumstances when two
present co-occupants take opposing positions on consent to a warrantless
search. 3 The Court chose to use social expectations as the measure for
reasonableness in distinguishing the reasonable search in Matlock from
74. See supra text accompanying note 62.
75. See supra text accompanying note 20 (explaining the Court's reasoning behind this
decision).
76. See supra text accompanying note 32.
77. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
78. Id. at 188-89 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
79. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006). The instant Court considered both social
custom and private law in weighing the justification of one co-occupant's consent to a warrantless
search when another present co-occupant objects to the search. Id.
80. See id. at 111-15.
81. See supratext accompanying note 61.
82. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. The instant Court explained that the authority of a single cooccupant to consent to a warrantless search of a shared residence is derived from the risk assumed
in co-occupant living situations. Id. at 111-12 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 16972 (1974)). It is expected that law enforcement officers will rely on this principle of assumed risk
when only one co-occupant is present and consents to a warrantless search. Id. Such a search is
considered to be reasonable. See id.
83. Id. at 113. One co-occupant consenting to a guest's entry of a shared residence, and
another refusing to allow that same guest to enter, puts the guest in an uncomfortable situation
where the guest is unlikely to enter the residence. Id. However, if only one co-occupant is present
upon the guest's arrival and that co-occupant consents to entry, the guest in that situation is likely
to enter the residence. See id.
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the unreasonable search in the instant case.84 The assumption of risk
consent 8to6
rationale that was critical to the justification of a third-party's
85
the warrantless search of a shared space in both Matlock and Frazier
did not exist in the instant facts.87 Therefore, the Court could not find
basis in reaching the reasonableness requirement in the instant
another
88
case.
The instant Court strengthened the Fourth Amendment's applicability
to co-occupants by holding a warrantless search unreasonable when one
co-occupant consents to a search while another present co-occupant refuses
it 89 by applying the measure of social expectations as the test for
reasonableness.9 ° The linchpin connecting the social expectations analysis
to the conclusion reached by the instant Court was the analysis of cooccupant authority.91 When two or more present co-occupants express
opposing views on any issue concerning all of the parties involved,
generally, no one co-occupant has any authority to supersede the opposing
views of any other.92 Therefore, authority being equal, if one present cooccupant consents to a warrantless search, and another one opposes it, then
law enforcement officers have not received valid consent and any search
under such circumstances would be unreasonable.93
The Court undoubtedly had its collective eyes on the policy endorsed
by its decision in the instant case, as well as that policy's effect on the
general population. To grant greater weight to one co-occupant's wishes
simply because that co-occupant would allow a search of the shared
residence despite the opposition of another present co-occupant would
erode the privacy protection of the Fourth Amendment.94 The repercussion
on the general population would be less Fourth Amendment protection
provided to co-occupants than those who choose to or are financially able

84. Id. at 111,114-15.
85. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974).
86. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
87. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113. The instant Court discusses assumption of risk when
referring to Matlock, but realizes there is no need to address assumed risk when each co-occupant
is present. See id.
88. See id. at 114.
89. See id. at 120.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 62, & 79.
91. See supratext accompanying notes 61 & 62. The authority analysis was necessary to the
instant Court's decision because it negated any possibility that consent to search somehow carried
more weight than an objection to the same search. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
92. See supra text accompanying note 61.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 61 & 62.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 61 & 62.
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to live on their own. If warrantless searches similar to the one performed
in the instant case were reasonable, then co-occupants would be effectively
lowered to second-class citizens to whom Fourth Amendment protection
has reduced applicability.
A critical focus of the instant Court's decision was directed at cooccupant authority.95 Obviously, an individual's privacy is reduced if that
individual lives in a residence as a co-occupant, except in domestic
violence situations." That individual's expectation of privacy is even
reduced as to societal authorities when the individual leaves the residence
or chooses to let other co-occupants answer a knock at the door.9 7
However, Fourth Amendment privacy protection must exist when the same
individual actively participates in the decision-making process of who
shall be permitted to enter that individual's residence.98 The Court's
removal of this historic and fundamental right would have undercut the
foundation of the Fourth Amendment that American citizens have relied
upon for centuries.
Turning the tide against growing case law to the contrary, 99 the U.S.
Supreme Court declared the actions of law enforcement officers in the
instant case unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 0 Consent to
perform a warrantless search of a shared residence is not obtained when
two or more present co-occupants disagree about whether to consent to
such a search.'' The decision provides each present co-occupant the right
to privacy in the home. An individual who resides alone may prevent law
enforcement intrusion simply by refusing to consent to a warrantless
search. The U.S. Supreme Court correctly decided to extend the Fourth
Amendment protection to each present co-occupant facing the same
situation.

95. See supra text accompanying note 59.
96. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118-19. "The undoubted right of the police to enter in order to
protect a victim, however, has nothing to do with the question in this case, whether a search with
the consent of one co-tenant is good against another, standing at the door and expressly refusing
consent." Id.
97. See supra text accompanying note 32.
98. See supratext accompanying note 62.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 20 and 34. In Rodriguez, the Court validated thirdparty consent to search a residence because law enforcement officers reasonably believed the thirdparty had authority to consent to the search. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
100. See supratext accompanying note 62.
101. See supratext accompanying note 62.
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